![]() ![]() ![]() If we use "meaning" in a wider sense, then we may want to say that meanings include both the referents themselves and the means of picking them out. So if we take a word's meaning to be the means of picking out its referent, then meanings are in our brains. It is probably an unreasonable expectation to know the explicit rule for picking out the intended referents. Humans are able to pick out the intended referents of words, such as "Tony Blair" or "bachelor," but this process need not be explicit. The phrase "Tony Blair" (or better still, just "Tony") does not have this recursive component problem, because it points straight to its referent, but how? If the meaning is the rule for picking out the referent, what is that rule, when we come down to non-decomposable components like proper names of individuals (or names of kinds, as in "an unmarried man" is a "bachelor")? But that does not settle the matter, because there's still the problem of the meaning of the components of that rule ("prime minister", "UK", "during", "current", "Cherie", "husband"), and how to pick them out. In that respect, (2) and (3) come closer to wearing their meanings on their sleeves, because they are explicitly stating a rule for picking out their referents: "Find whoever was prime minister of the UK during the year 2004", or "find whoever is Cherie's current husband". Some have suggested that the meaning of a (referring) word is the rule or features that one must use in order to successfully pick out its referent. This is most clearly illustrated using the proper names of concrete individuals, but it is also true of names of kinds of things and of abstract properties: (1) "Tony Blair", (2) "the prime minister of the UK during the year 2004", and (3) "Cherie Blair's husband" all have the same referent, but not the same meaning. Gottlob Frege distinguished a referent (the thing that a word refers to) and the word's meaning. The problem of meaning is in turn related to the problem of how it is that mental states are meaningful, hence to the problem of consciousness: what is the connection between certain physical systems and the contents of subjective experiences. In cognitive science and semantics, the symbol grounding problem concerns how it is that words ( symbols in general) get their meanings, and hence is closely related to the problem of what meaning itself really is. ( Learn how and when to remove this template message) Please improve the article by adding information on neglected viewpoints, or discuss the issue on the talk page. VTT (FI): Data analysis and interpretation (M20-22, secondment mentor: M.This article may be unbalanced towards certain viewpoints.LIH (DE): Identify industry-based subject matter experts to define inland waterway stakeholders actor competencies and capacities (M12-14, secondment mentor: T.Develop guidelines for information/data standardization, classification and structure to support improved system situation awareness and collaborative decision-making.Improved operational safety and efficiency, decrease environmental insults, support regulatory framework development and contribute to innovative business models.Define, develop and integrate critical AI and automation tactics using actor network and Human-Centered Design (HCD) approaches to support operation logistics (data propagation, updating, validation and coordination).Improve collaborative decision-making platforms and information management strategies.Project title/WP: Data content, sharing and exploitation: defining common ground and actor network for collaborative decision making in autonomous inland waterways ( WP3) ![]()
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